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China's Economic and Political Clout
Grows in Latin America at the Expense of
U.S. Interests
Juan Vega*

INTRODUCTION
For many years during the Cold War, the Third World was
a battleground for two superpowers-the United States and the
former Soviet Union. These two nations fought to exert their influence throughout Latin America in order to gain political, economic, and military clout. When the Soviet Union fell, the
United States lost interest in its relationship with Latin American countries. During the past five years, China has stepped
into the void left by these two retreating superpowers. 1 As
China increases and solidifies economic ties to the region and
secures oil, minerals, and other commodities from this region, it
gains economic and political influence at the expense of U.S. interests. If Chinese economic power surpasses that of the United
States, Latin American countries may no longer feel the need to
cooperate with U.S. initiatives in trade, human rights, antinarcotics, environmental safeguards, and U.S. national security. In
* The author, a Nicaraguan immigrant, is a 2006 J.D. candidate at the University of
Minnesota Law School; M.B.A 2002, University of Florida; B.A., 1994, Virginia Tech.
He counseled Latin American security personnel in military bases, police departments, the Panama Canal, and infrastructure consturction projects. He thanks his
wife, Katherine, the source of all his inspiration.
1. See generally Mary Anastasia O'Grady, The Middle Kingdom in Latin
America, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2004, at All (noting that leaders of some Latin
American countries see China as an alternative to dealing with the United States
and that anti-American sentiment is rising). In referring to China's investments in
Latin America, the Institute of Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami quoted Dr. Cynthia Watson: "They are interested in oil contracts in
Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia.... Mhey want to show Latin American nations
that they will treat them as sovereigns, that they won't preach to them and they will
act as partners." Id. Dr. Watson is a professor of strategy at the National War College in Washington. Id.
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China, Latin America is likely to find an attractive alternative
to economic trade that is not contingent upon U.S. interests.
The Monroe Doctrine proclaimed that the Western Hemisphere is "America's backyard." 2 The United States helped
Latin American countries gain their independence from Spain
and later in the twentieth century, assisted them in the process
of democratization. 3 Stable democracies in Latin America reduce regional crises and increase cooperation. Today, the
United States needs a stable Latin America in order to assure
4
itself an important source of regional oil.

This Note seeks to highlight a potential threat to the economic, political, and military interests of the United States in
Latin America as China's economic influence grows. Part I discusses current U.S. and Chinese trade relations with Latin
American countries. Part II analyzes the potential consequences of China's increasing economic activity in Latin America, why the United States must counter it, and how it must do
so. Part II also analyzes U.S. insistence of dealing with the issue of agricultural subsidies only through the legal framework
of the World Trade Organization Agreement on Agriculture and
its effect on the future of the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas. This Note concludes that if the United States does
not counter China's aggressive economic involvement in Latin
America, the United States will lose clout in the event of a confrontation with China. Instead of the current approach, the
United States should pursue bilateral agreements and, together
with each Latin American country, put in place social policies
that will enable Latin Americans to adjust to free trade.
I. UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND LATIN AMERICA
A. UNITED STATES TRADE RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

1. HistoricalTrade Figuresand New Trade Initiatives
Annual trade between the United States and Latin America

2. Richard E. Friedman, Letter from the Publisher,NAT'L STRATEGY F. REV.,
Fall 2004, at 4, availableat http://www.nationalstrategy.com/Fall%202004.pdf.
3. Id.
4. See id.
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(including the Caribbean) is approximately $360 billion. 5 This
is almost as much as the United States trades with the entire
European Community. 6 "By the year 2010, U.S. trade with
Latin America is expected to exceed that with the European
Economic Community and Japan combined." 7 Currently, the
United States has various trade agreements with Latin American and Caribbean countries.
The United States, Mexico, and Canada signed the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),8 which came into
force in the United States on January 1, 1994.9 It eliminated
tariffs between these three countries on most of the products
they manufacture. 10 In its effort to promote a good working relation within the NAFTA framework, the United States established consultative committees through which trade differences
could be addressed." The only other Western Hemisphere free
trade agreement to which the United States is a party is the
Chile Free Trade Agreement (Chile FTA).12 Chile and the
United States have eliminated tariffs on eighty-five percent of
trade and will phase out remaining tariffs by 2007.13 One reason that the United States entered into this free trade agreement with Chile was to reward Chile for its low level of corrup5. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year
2004: Hearings Before the Comm. on Armed Services United States Senate, 108th
Cong. 535 (2003) (statement of Gen. James T. Hills), available at http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2003March/Hill.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Hearings].
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. For text, see North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 605.
9. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act § 101, 19
U.S.C. § 3301 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA Implementation Act]; Exec. Order No.
12,889, 58 Fed. Reg. 69,681 (Dec. 27, 1993).
10. See NAFTA Implementation Act § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 3301 (1993).
11. U.S.-Latin American Trade Policy Initiatives Beyond NAFTA,
AGEXPORTER, May 2003, at 7, available at http:lwww.fas.usda.gov/infolagexporterl
2003JMay/pgpercent207.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Trade Policy Initiatives].
12. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United
States and Chile Sign Historic Free Trade Agreement (June 6, 2003), available at
http://www/ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary[PressReleases/2003/June/UnitedStatesC
hileSignHistoricFreeTradeAgreement.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Chile FTA]. See generally Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7; OFFICE
OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF THE U.S.CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 3 (2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/

TradeAgreements/BilateralChileFTAassetupload file411_5109.pdf (last visited
Jan. 28, 2004) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW].
13. Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7.
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tion.14 As of October 2004, Congress has passed no implementing act.
The United States is pursuing the Central America Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with five Central American nations:
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 15 Although negotiations were scheduled to be completed by
December 2003, as of October 2004 no agreement had been
reached. 16 The United States Senate is to debate the issue in
2005.17
The United States Congress passed the Caribbean Trade
Partnership Act in 2002.18 The Act expanded the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 which provides preferential treatment for the importation of certain products from Caribbean
20
countries.
In 2002, the United States enacted the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. 21 The Act was an expansion
of the Andean Trade Preference Act, 22 which was first passed in
1991.23
It gave the President the power to grant duty-free
treatment for eligible articles. 24 The Act granted additional

14. See Hearings, supranote 5, at 535-42.
15. See Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that CAFTA will
comprise thirty-five million consumers among five countries).
16. See id.
17. Friedman, supra note 2, at 5.
18. Trade Policy Initiatives, supranote 11, at 7.
19. For the Executive Summary, see THOMAS F. JENNINGS ET AL., U.S. INT'L
TRADE COMM'N, CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT: IMPACT ON U.S.
INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS, at v (1994), availableat http:/lhotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/
pubs/332/pub2927/pub2927.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). For the 2003 report assessing the effects of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act on the U.S. economy, on U.S. industries, and on U.S. consumers, see WALKER A. POLLAR ET AL., U.S.
INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE IMPACT OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY
ACT 1-1 (2003), available at http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/332/pub3636/
pub3636.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
20. See 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (listing the twenty-seven beneficiary countries);
Trade Policy Initiatives, supranote 11, at 7.
21. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-210, 116 Stat. 1023 (2002). For background information, see Office of Management and Budget, H.R. 3009-Andean Trade Promotion and Drug EradicationAct
(Nov. 16, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ombflegislative/sap/1O7-1[HR3009h.html (lastvisited Jan. 25, 2005); Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7.
22. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (1991). For background information, see U.S. Department of Commerce, Andean Trade Preference Act, at http://www/mac.doc.gov/
atpa/webmain/intro-revise.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
23. Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7.
24. 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (1991) ('The President may proclaim duty-free treatment
for all eligible articles from any beneficiary country in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.").

20051

China's Clout Grows in Latin America

trade benefits 25 and increased the list of duty-free items to
6,300.26 Although this and other trade acts have improved economic relations between the United States and its neighbors to
the south, the United States has more ambitious goals.
The United States aims to set up a free trade zone in this
hemisphere. 2 7 The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)28
would include thirty-four of the hemisphere's thirty-five nations
(excluding Cuba). 29 The FTAA would thus bring 800 million
people into a single market. 30 However, several sources of friction, especially ongoing disputes between the United States and
it
some Latin American countries, particularly Brazil, will make
31
unlikely that an agreement will be reached any time soon.
2. Sources of Friction
Many Latin American governments and their citizens do
not support the FTAA.32 Presidents Nestor Kirchner of Argen25. See id. § 3203.
26. See id; Trade Policy Initiatives, supranote 11, at 7.
27. See Mario E. Carranza, Mercosur, The Free Trade Area of the Americas, and
the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 103031 (2004) (noting that the FTAA negotiations were launched in April 1998 and were
supposed to be concluded by January 2005). The FTAA would annex the Latin
American economies to the U.S. economy and this would eliminate all barriers to
U.S. investment in the region, which includes national restrictions on government
procurement. Id. at 1032. It would also allow U.S. firms "to sue the Latin American
governments over health, labor, and environmental laws." Id. See generally Rafael
Lorente, Trade Key to Latin America Strategy but Some FearBush's Approach is Too
Narrow, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 3, 2003, at 1A, 2003 WL 65981736 (discussing
that the United States seeks to have a hemispheric free trade agreement and that it
uses trade agreements to promote democracy).
28. For background information, see Free Trade of the Americas, at
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/SPCOMMltci/tnmin22_e.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2005);
Carranza, supra note 27, at 1030 (noting that the FTAA negotiations were launched
on April 18-19, 1998).
29. Lorente, supra note 27, at IA.
30. See Trade Policy Initiatives, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that the U.S. proposal providing that fifty-six percent of agricultural imports from countries in this
800 million-people region will be duty-free as soon as the FVAA takes effect and that
other agricultural tariffs "will fall into staging categories of five years, [ten] years, or
longer"). Nations should get different rates of reductions depending on their economic size and level of development. Id.
31. Lorente, supra note 27, at IA (asserting that disputes between Brazil and
other nations in the region are making it less likely that the FTAA will be completed
by 2005).
32. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1033-34 & n.12 (noting that seventy-six
percent of those polled in Brazil, the largest economy in South America, believed
that free trade in this hemisphere would benefit the United States primarily); Oppenheimer, infra note 43 (discussing the poll conducted by Zogby International and
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tina and Luiz Inicio Lula da Silva of Brazil have publicly criti33
cized it.
Mr. Enrique Espinosa, a former trade negotiator for
Mexico, said "It would be very bad to rush the negotiation in order to meet the deadline." 34 President da Silva recently traveled
to China as part of a mission to rearrange global trade.35 By negotiating trade deals with China, Brazil and Argentina are attempting to challenge U.S. domination in free-trade talks in the
Western Hemisphere. 36 The major sources of friction include
the perception of hypocrisy on the part of the United States on
free trade and the perception of lopsided benefits given to the
United States from the FTAA.37 Many Latin Americans, correctly or not, think that the United States treats their countries
as inferior nations that are expected to support U.S. interests,
rather than as equal trading partners.3 8 Another source of fricthe University of Miami). Thirty-nine percent of those polled said that the FTAA
would benefit both Latin America and the United States. Carranza, supra note 27,
at 1033-34 & n.12. The United States wants to gain access to the MERCOSUR-the
southern trade bloc comprising Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay-before
this bloc establishes a free trade deal with the European Union. See id. at 1031,
1034; Carlos A. Ball, U.S. Policy Has Gone South, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at B13
(noting that Latin Americans oppose the FTAA for various reasons including the fact
that the United States insists on free trade but gives its farmers generous subsidies). The United States imposes strict labor and environment standards that may
remove competitive advantages that smaller countries may have over the United
States. Id.
33. Geri Smith, The Latin Chill May Get Even Frostier, BUS. WK., Jan. 26,
2004, at 63.
34. Talking Trade, LATIN TRADE, Sept. 2004, at 19; see also Makram Haluani,
Benign Neglect, HARV. INT'L REV., Winter 2003, at 50 (discussing that Latin American nations are hesitant about moving too quickly and opening their markets).
Rushing to set up the FTAA may result in negative economic consequences in Latin
American countries. See id. at 52. Many have refused to open their government
procurement bidding processes to foreign companies. Id.
35.

See Brazil: ChinaAppeal, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT-Bus. LATIN AM.,

May 17, 2004, at 2, 2004 WL 63625721 (noting that Brazil sees a tremendous economic opportunity in China).
36. Id.
37. See Ball, supra note 32, at B13.
38. See Brian Selmeski, Latin America: Latin America 101, NAT'L STRATEGY F.
REV., Fall 2004, at 6, available at http://www.nationalstrategy.com/Fall%202004.pdf
(last visited Jan. 21, 2005) (arguing that the United States should not ignore, confuse, or bully Latin Americans). The United States should view Latin America as an
opportunity and learn about the region's culture and intimate issues. Id. at 12. It
should take elected officials and their national priorities seriously as well as their
limitations. Id. It should recognize that free trade is not desirable nor is it possible
at this time. Id. The United States should promote freer trade with greater sensitivity and safeguards for these countries instead of pressuring Latin American politicians. Id. Finally, it should support the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs)
established by the United Nations to address poverty, education, healthcare, HIV
prevention, and the environment. Id.
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tion is that many Latin Americans have not seen the promised
benefits of capitalism and have grown skeptical of democracy in
39
general.
The perceived U.S. hypocrisy was at its highest level in
March 2002, when President Bush imposed tariffs on steel from
Brazil and Venezuela 40 and announced a $130 billion subsidy
package for U.S. farmers. 41 The Bush Administration also imposed a sixty percent surcharge on orange-juice concentrate
from Brazil, protecting 90,000 orange-growing farmers in Florida. 42

Brazil and Argentina are demanding that the United

States cut its agricultural subsidies, but the United States insists that it will address the issue of agricultural subsidies only
at the World Trade Organization (WTO), which offers a flexible
legal framework within which the United States can continue
its agricultural subsidies. 43 These protectionist measures add to
Latin Americans' perception of the United States being not fully
44
committed to free trade in the Americas.
China, on the other hand, has lowered its own tariffs from
forty-one percent in 1992 to six percent after joining the WTO in
December of 2001. 4 5

It has the lowest tariff protection of any

39. Ball, supra note 32, at B13 (noting that Latin Americans' contempt for capitalism was demonstrated at President Kirchner's inauguration in Argentina when
Fidel Castro, the strongest opponent of capitalism in this hemisphere, received a
standing ovation).
40. Haluani, supranote 34, at 51.
41. For statutory text, see Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-171 § 1103, 116 Stat. 134 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C.). See also id..; Carranza, supra note 27, at 1063 &
n. 102 (noting that in 2002 President Bush imposed steel tariffs, which were eventually cancelled in December 2003 to avoid retaliatory tariffs from the European Union and Japan) (citing Dan Freeman, Steel May Test Bush Mettle, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 5, 2003, at IA).
42. Carranza, supra note 27, at 1063.
43. Id. at 1057 (discussing Brazil's insistence on agricultural concessions from
the United States, while the United States maintains that it is a non-negotiable
matter); Carranza, supra note 27, at 1050 (noting that the United States wants to
exclude farm subsidies from the FTAA negotiations and instead utilize the WTO
framework in the Doha Round of global trade talks); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Food, Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 455-58 (2002) (arguing that the
text of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture gives countries enough flexibility to protect their agricultural industries); Andres Oppenheimer, Latin Nations Fear Freetrade Scales Tip Toward U.S., AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 4, 2003, at 3, 2003 WL
2491245.

44. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1057 (discussing that Brazil does not think
that the United States is seriously committed to the FTAA because the United
States refuses to offer reciprocal concessions).
45. The Dragon and the Eagle, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2004, at 6.
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developing nation in the world. 46
There is wide disappointment in capitalism and in democracy among many Latin Americans. Political and economic
movements in Latin America made up of unions, farmers, and
Indian groups are becoming more common and powerful. 47 The
adjustments that Latin Americans have made for globalization
have damaged certain sectors of their economies, particularly in
infrastructure-related areas such as transportation, communications, and technology. 48 Many Latin Americans have lost faith
in the democratic process and in politicians. 49 They have resorted to voting for priests, ex-coup leaders, and inexperienced
populists, 50 many of whom have successfully encouraged suspi51
cion of capitalism.
Many Latin Americans feel that the United States does not
treat their countries as equal partners. An integral part of the
Hispanic culture can be summed up with the word cortesia,
meaning courtesy. 52 It is this system of "courtesies, traditions,
and values that bind Latin American society." 53 However, instead of respecting this cultural understanding, the United
States has alternated between bullying and ignoring Latin
America. 54 Latin Americans believe that during its War on Ter46. Id. The Chinese yuan was pegged to the U.S. dollar at an artificially low
rate. Id. at 14, 16. Pegging the yuan to the U.S. dollar helps keep China's exports
competitive, which creates jobs for their many underemployed workers. Id. This
has also helped China double its foreign-exchange reserves to $480 billion, most of it
in U.S. government securities. Id. In a sense, China is financing the U.S. currentaccount deficit. Id.
47. Selmeski, supra note 38, at 8 (noting that "Indians, landless peoples, urban
poor, and others" are increasing in outspokenness and power). "Frustration with
broken promises and worsening conditions has also meant that popular protests remain a key part of the region's democratic process." Id.
48. See Jodo P. Koslovski, A Strategic View of Negotiations Between Brazilian
AgriculturalCooperatives and the WTO, at http://www.agricoop.org/activities/
ICAO%20Koslovski.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2005) (discussing that fast pace and
fierce competition has led to policies that have hurt infrastructure projects throughout the region).
49. Bolivia's Referendum: Counter-reform-orMuddle Along?, ECONOMIST, Jul.
17, 2004, at 35; Selmeski, supra note 38, at 8 ("A 2004 United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) report entitled "Democracy in Latin America"... concluded that
nearly fifty-five percent of the region's inhabitants would prefer an authoritarian
government to a democratic one if it could better their economic circumstances.").
50. Selmeski, supra note 38, at 8.
51. See David Luhnow, Free Markets Spur Protest, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2004,
at A18.
52. Friedman, supra note 2, at 5 (defining "cortesia"as "a system of courtesies,
traditions, and values that bind Latin American society").
53. Id.
54. Selmeski, supra note 38, at 6 (noting that "skeptics are likely wondering
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ror, the United States seems to have forgotten Latin America. 55
Even before the preoccupation with the War on Terror, U.S. embassies in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico had no ambassadors
for a period of at least two years during the 1990's.56 This lack

of cortesia and other sources of friction have created the opportunity for an economic and political alternative-China replacing
the United States.
B. CHINA'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRIES

1. China's Growing Economic Clout
In 1979, General Secretary of the Communist Party, Deng
Xiaoping, initiated economic reform that transformed China
from a control economy to a market economy. 57

During the

1990s China set up economic zones to encourage foreign companies to open plants and factories.58 Since that time, foreign
trade has been liberalized, 59 financial markets have been created, 60 China's gross national product has grown dramatically, 61
and ties with neighboring countries have improved. 62 In 2003,
due to foreign direct investment, China exported $438 billion
worth of goods. 63 China's gross domestic product accounts for
whether Latin America really matters to the United States any more, considering
the urgency of current events in the Middle East and Central Asia").
55. Id.
56. Cynthia A. Watson, That Sinking Feeling Again: Deterioration in U.S.Latin American Relations, NAT'L STRATEGY F. REV., Spring 2001, available at
http://www.nationalstrategy.com/nsr/vlOn3SpringO1/100319.htm (last visited Jan.
31, 2005).
57. Steven L. Chan, Book Note, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 211, 211 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: How ECONOMIC REFORM IS
CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER (1993)) (discussing that China broke up collective
farms, began its manufacturing drive, and invited foreign investment).
58. Michael O'Boyle, The China Threat, Bus. MEX., Oct. 1, 2003, at 30.
59. WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: HOW ECONOMIC REFORM IS
CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER 30 (1993).
60. Id. at 45-46.
61. Id. at 29-30.
62. Id. at 321-22.
63. Neil King, Jr., A Whole New World, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2004, at R1, 2004
WL-WSJ 56941795 (noting that during the 1980s, foreign manufacturers in Taiwan,
Japan, and South Korea opened factories in China in order to take advantage of the
cheap labor, in the late 1990s, dozens of multinational corporations opened factories
in China, and from 2000 to 2003, as many as 60,000 new factories were opened in
China by foreign companies); The Dragon and the Eagle, supra note 45, at 4 (noting
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thirteen percent of world output, second only to the United
States. 64 China's gross domestic product grew approximately
65
nine percent and eight percent in 2003 and 2002, respectively,
and its economic expansion has averaged almost eight percent

per year between 1999 and 2003.66
Some economists think that China's economy will cool and
that its expectations are overblown. 67 Other economists believe
that China's financial system is unable to allocate capital efficiently, thereby lowering its return on investment. 68 However,
most economists predict that China will grow no less than seven
or eight percent per year between 2004 and 2008.69 China has
many attractive qualities for foreign investors such as an endless supply of Chinese low-skilled laborers who work long days
at forty cents per hour. 70 At the upper end of the market, Chinese schools produce competent engineers that can be hired for
as little as $3,000 per year. 71 China also offers an enormous
domestic market. 72 According to China expert Daniel Rosen, a
fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C., "China offers great production costs for exporting to
the global market, but it also offers a domestic market with
that China is the largest recipient of foreign direct investment and that within one
decade it could be the world's largest exporter and importer, enough to overtake the
United States and become the world's largest economy).
64. The Dragonand the Eagle, supra note 45, at 4.
65. Phelim Kyne, Foreign Investment in China Remains Strong, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 16, 2004, at A15.
66. Brazil: China Appeal, supra note 35.
67. See The Dragonand the Eagle, supra note 45, at 6 (discussing that China
suffers serious problems that may curtail its growth, such as a fragile banking system, widespread corruption, environmental pollution, and the risk of social and political unrest exacerbated by income inequalities and continuing human rights
abuses).
68. See id. at 7-8 (noting that China has over-invested in sectors such as cars
and steel and therefore some projects will not be profitable).
69. Latin America: Made in China,ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT-Bus. LATIN
AM., Apr. 12, 2004, at 3, 2004 WL 63625618.
70. O'Boyle, supra note 58; Don Bauder, China Factor Involves a Hefty Helping
of Angst, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 19, 2003, at C1, 2003 WL 6566972 (discussing that Chinese manufacturing wages average sixty cents per hour, which is five
percent of the average U.S. laborer and ten percent of other Asian laborers).
71. O'Boyle, supra note 58; Mei Fong, et al., Chinese Manufacturers Are Closing
Quality Gap, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2004, at A17. Ernest Preeg, a senior fellow in
trade and productivity at the research institute Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI, predicts that China will surpass Japan and move into a "three-way relationship with
the U.S. and Europe in the area of advanced technology products" within the next
decade. Id.
72. The Dragon and the Eagle, supra note 45, at 4 (noting that China's imports
grew by forty percent in 2003).
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enormous growth potential." 73
2. China'sInvestments in Key Sectors in Latin America: Oil,
Commodities, and Infrastructures
China's high demand for commodities has driven up the
price of metals, agricultural products, and oil.7 4 China is a major importer of raw materials, a plentiful commodity in Latin
America.75 This makes doing business with China very attractive to Latin American countries, especially Brazil.7 6 For example, China's top steel maker, Baosteel, is considering a joint venture with Brazil's Companhia Vale de Rio Doce, the world's top
77
iron ore miner.
Latin America and the Caribbean provide over thirty percent of U.S. imported oil, which is more than all of the Middle
Eastern countries combined.7 8 But China is not just securing oil
and commodities from Latin American countries, it is becoming
intimately involved in its extraction, transportation and infrastructure construction.7 9 China's approach has been to show
Latin American countries that, unlike the United States, it will
treat them as sovereigns and as partners.
In 2003, trade between China and Brazil totaled eight billion dollars, making China Brazil's second-largest trading part73. O'Boyle, supra note 58.
74. See Latin America. Made in China, supra note 69, at 3; Brian Bremner and
Dexter Roberts, The Great Oil Hunt, Bus. WK., Nov. 15, 2004, at 60; see What has
China Cost Mexico, LATIN AM., MEXICO & NAFTA REP., Mar. 9, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Mexico & Nafta Report File (noting that China's oil imports increased onethird in 2003 and that some forecasters expect China to import as much oil in 2020
as did the world's largest oil importer, the United States, in 2003); The Dragon and
the Eagle, supra note 45, at 12 (asserting that China's demand for oil is maintaining
high oil prices worldwide). According to the International Energy Agency, China's
increase in annual demand for oil in 2004 will be approximately fifteen percent
greater than the increase in 2003, with a daily consumption of over six million barrels per day. Jeffrey Ball, Efforts to Reduce U.S. Addiction to Oil Are Few, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 28, 2004, at A8.
75. Latin America: Made in China, supranote 69.
76. Id. (discussing China's future role as a leader of investment in the region,
especially in Brazil).
77. Id. (noting that China is also an important market for Peru's metals, as
well as Mexican and Venezuelan oil).
78. Hearings, supra note 5, at 3.
79. See supra text accompanying note 77; Venezuelan PDVSA to Invest in
China, LATIN AM. NEWS DIG., Sept. 10, 2004, 2004 WL 82097926 [hereinafter
PDVSA] (noting that China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is involved in
forty projects in thirty-two countries worldwide including Venezuela's state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA)).
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ner after the United States.8 0 Brazil is China's largest trading
partner in Latin America and annual bilateral trade has tripled
since 2000.81 Both countries recently took part in a workshop
entitled "Brazil and China in the 21st Century," at which Chinese entrepreneurs sought Brazilian partners in economic sectors such as oil and agriculture.8 2 China seeks to invest directly
in Brazil's infrastructure,8 3 where it has agreed to invest between $3 billion and $4 billion in railways and refineries.8 4
With Argentina, China seeks not only bilateral trade
agreements but also to become an investment partner, particularly in the infrastructure and transportation sectors.8 5 To this
end, Argentine President, Nestor Kirchner, and Chinese President, Hu Jintao, signed an agreement on June 28, 2004, which
enables both countries to jointly begin construction of a railway
and allows Argentina to export its citrus fruit to China.8 6
Realizing that it must work with China because it cannot
compete against it, Mexico has decided to increase its exploration and production of oil to satisfy China's demand.8 7 In February 2004, Mexico held a conference entitled "China's Influence
on Mexico's Future," at which Mexico's ambassador to China
80. Latin America: Made in China, supra note 69.
81. See Brazil: China Appeal, supra note 35 and accompanying text (reporting
that annual trade between Brazil and China should reach $10 billion in 2005).
82. See Brazil Exports to China at $1.1 Bln Q1 2004, LATIN AM. NEWS DIG.,
Apr. 27, 2004, 2004 WL 65869970 [hereinafter Brazil Exports]. China currently imports steel products, pulp and paper, chemical, and plastic products from Brazil. Id.
83. Brazil: ChinaAppeal, supra note 35.
84. China Mulls Up to $4 Bln Investments in Brazil, LATIN AM. NEWS DIG.,
Apr. 15, 2004, 2004 WL 65869461 (noting that Chinese companies are primarily interested in investing in railways, oil and refineries, and raw materials, including an
important railway project connecting Brazil to the Pacific ports of Chile); see also
Brazil, China Sign MOUs on Chinese Investment in Energy Projects, BBC
MONITORING ASIA PAc., Sept. 8, 2004, 2004 90389170 (noting that China has also
expressed interest in expanding investments in Brazil's Free Trade Zone of
Manaus).
85. See Argentina to Export Citrus Fruit to China, LATIN AM. NEWS DIG., June
30, 2004, 2004 WL 82096240 [hereinafter Fruit to China] (discussing that Argentina
will shortly start exporting citrus fruit to China, which could reach $150 million per
year, while China will also work on investment and joint projects in Argentina, including a railway construction project).
86. See id.
87. See What has China Cost Mexico, supra note 74 ("Mexico cannot expect to
compete successfully with China because... China's labour is cheaper and, arguably, its supply chain (infrastructure, electricity, logistics) is more efficient."). Mexico's share of U.S. imports fell in 2002 because it has been undercut in the U.S. market by China. Id. Mexico is starting to develop a policy that will allow it to make
use of its comparative advantages. Id. It plans, for example, to follow Brazil's lead
and will supply China with the commodities that China needs, primarily oil. Id.
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announced that Mexico will increase its oil output to meet
88
China's demands.
China has agreed to invest in Venezuela's state oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA).89 Venezuela's Foreign
Minister met with the managers of China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) in order to establish a strategic alliance
over the exploration, transformation, and transportation of
crude oil, including upgrading necessary infrastructure. 90
China also has indicated interest in investing $3 billion in Ecuador, primarily in its oil sector. 91
China is even courting smaller, sometimes forgotten countries. China expressed interest in investing in the construction
of a new canal through Central America. 92 The proposed canal
would cost $20 billion and would utilize Lake Nicaragua and one
river in southeast Nicaragua. 93 Guyana and China enjoy bilateral economic and technical cooperation. 94 President Hu Jintao
said that China is willing to develop relations with Caribbean
countries that would be of mutual benefit to Latin America and
China. 95 This cooperation increases access for Latin American
businesses to the growing Chinese consumer market.

88. Mexico: Eyeing Oil Exports to China, LATIN NEWS DAILY, Feb. 24, 2004,
2004 WL 67935290.
89. PDVSA, supra note 79 (noting that China's investment in the Venezuelan
petroleum industry will strengthen China and Venezuela's strategic alliance).
90. Id.; see also Chinese Yankuang to Start Railroad Repair Works in Venezuela, LATIN AM. NEWS DIG., Sept. 20, 2004, 2004 WL 82098141 (reporting that
China will invest $3 billion to repair a railroad network linking central and western
Venezuela).
91. China Reportedly Interested in Investing in Ecuadoran Oil, BBC
MONITORING LATIN AM., Jan. 7, 2003, 2004 WL 4133432 [hereinafter Ecuador] (reporting that the Chinese government invited a government delegation of Ecuadorians to China, "which facilitated contacts for meetings with board members from the
Sinopeg Oil Company, China's largest refinery, and the China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) in order to attract foreign investment to Ecuador").
92. Chinese Govt. Interested in Interocean Canal Investment, BUS. NEWS AM.,
Sept. 2, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Business News Americas File (reporting that,
unlike the Panama Canal, the new canal would be able to accommodate ships of
250,000 tons, many of which transport iron-ore from Brazil and Venezuela to China;
the Panama Canal can accommodate ships no heavier than 50,000 tons).
93. Id.
94. Hu Xiao, Leaders Seek Expansion of Cooperation, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 28,
2003, 2003 WL 3053610 (naming various cooperative projects between Guyana and
China in industry, agriculture, and hydroelectric energy).
95. See id. (noting that President Hu Jintao expressed understanding for the
challenges that Caribbean countries face in the global market).
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3. Chinese Market Attractiveness to Latin American Countries
Eager to obtain new customers, foreign manufacturers and
distributors want to tap into all areas of the growing Chinese
market. 96 China is rapidly creating the largest middle class in
the world, which will have tremendous buying power. 97 Foreign
direct investment in China increased nineteen percent, to $43.6
billion, from January to August 2004 alone. 98 China consumes
an increasing amount of oil and commodities and it opened its
agricultural market because it needs to import great quantities
of food. 99

Latin American leaders welcome an economic power that
treats them as true partners and provides an attractive economic alternative to dealing with the United States.10 0 The
trade trip to China by Brazil's president in May of 2004 underscores this point.101

Given China's needs for the raw materials

that Latin American countries have and given China's cooperation in infrastructure and satellite technology development, it
appears as though China, Brazil, and other Latin American
102
countries are entering an era of greater cooperation.

96. Cf. China/BrazilBilateral Trade to Hit US$5 Bil-Serbia to Increase Business with Brazil, VALOR ECONOMICO, July 2, 2003, 2004 WL 65878955 [hereinafter
China/Brazil] (noting as an example that Embraer, one of the largest Brazilian aircraft manufacturers, has partnered with a Chinese company to install its first assembly line in China because "China has become an important focus to the company").
97. O'Boyle, supra note 58, at 32; see China/Brazil,supra note 96.
98. Kyne, supra note 65, at A15. For a discussion predicting China's future,
see Kenneth Lieberthal, China in 2033, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 44.
99. Brazil: China Appeal, supra note 35 (reporting that China, Brazil's thirdlargest customer, has a strong demand for Brazil's soya beans and that exports to
China of Brazilian soya beans and iron ore account for approximately sixty-eight
percent of Brazil's total exports to China); see also Chile, China Review Joint FTA
Economic Study Progress, LATIN AM. NEWS DIG., June 4, 2004, 2004 WL 65871224
(noting that trade delegations from the two countries recently agreed on a plan for
Chile to export fruit to China in 2004).
100. See O'Grady, supra note 1.
101. See Brazil: China Appeal, supra note 35.
102. See id.; Brazilian Foreign Minister Interviewed on Ties with China, BBC
MONITORING ASIA PAc., Mar. 29, 2004, 2004 WL 72819223 (noting that Brazilian
Minister of Foreign Relations, Ambassador Celso Amorim, spoke highly of the
achievements Brazil and China have made through cooperation in the science, technology, and cultural fields and remarked that there is still huge potential for further
development of trade relations).
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C. LATIN AMERICA AND U.S. INTERESTS

1. U.S. Oil Interests
Roger Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, has stated that President Bush's policy on
Latin America "is based on promoting democracy through programs aimed at curbing corruption and improving education,
promoting trade, and fighting drug trafficking."'10 3 Latin America is also an essential source of oil for the United States. 04 As
China gains more clout in Latin America, the United States may
obtain less cooperation from Latin American countries with regard to securing oil, promoting human rights, expanding
antinarcotics programs, fighting terrorism, assuring U.S. national security, promoting democracy and higher environmental
105
standards, and reaching long-term trade agreements.
It is imperative for the United States to secure future
sources of oil from Latin America. Twenty percent of U.S. energy originates in the Andean countries, which comprise Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela. 106 Fourteen of that
twenty percent originates in Venezuela. 107 Unrest in Venezuela
and other oil-producing countries in Latin America as well as
rising anti-U.S. sentiment throughout the region may jeopardize
the United States's access to Latin American oil.108 The election
103.
104.

Lorente, supra note 27.
See Alfredo Corchado, Summit Starts in Mexico: Hemisphere Needs Hope,

Analysts Say, as Fox Hosts Bush, Other Leaders, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 12,

2004, 2004 WL 56658272; Bolivia's Referendum: Counter-reform--orMuddle Along?,
supra note 49.
105. See O'Grady, supra note 1, at All. The author states the following concerns:
The rise of China in the region could complicate U.S. efforts to control illegal immigration, weapons shipments, the drug trade and money laundering because China is cooperating with Latin countries that are not especially friendly toward those efforts. Some of these nations may try to use
the Chinese alternative to challenge U.S. hegemony.

Id.
106. See Corchado, supranote 104, at Al.
107. Id.
108. Selmeski, supra note 38, at 4 (discussing that until recently, Mexico had
only one political party and it has a ten-year-old, growing insurgency that opposes
NAFTA). In Venezuela, President Chavez recently won a referendum to stay in
power by urging voters to vote for him in order to defy the United States. Id. Colombia is the heart of the "War on Drugs," and it has the longest running civil war in
this hemisphere. Id. Argentina suffered an economic crisis in 2001 that forced half
the population into poverty. Id. Brazil would likely oppose a regional free trade
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of leftist leaders to positions of power and a movement throughout Latin America to nationalize the oil industry further add to
this potential decrease in U.S. access to Latin American oil.109
2. Human Right and Narcotics Trafficking
For years the United States has worked to promote human
rights throughout Latin America. In contrast, on June 4, 1989
in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, hundreds of student demonstrators who were advocating for greater freedom were killed by soldiers in the Chinese army. 110 Fifteen years later, some of the
surviving students remain in prison as do many political prisoners.1 1 In the meantime, democratic countries in Latin America
and Europe have been willing to overlook China's violations of
human rights. 112 On the global scale, China's economic investments in other countries, like the Sudan, have frustrated U.S.
13
efforts to promote human rights.
agreement. Id. See generally Hearings,supra note 5, at 535 (noting that the volatility in the Middle East makes Latin American oil supply even more imperative).
109. See generally Bolivia's Referendum: Counter-reform-orMuddle Along?; supra note 49 (noting that Venezuela relies on multinational corporations to produce
oil but President Chavez is working to establish Petrosur, a regional state-owned
company, to increase government control of the oil sector). Argentina's President
Kirchner has also announced his intention to create a new state oil company. Id. In
Bolivia, the leftist groups that overthrew President Gonzalo Sinchez de Lozada are
pushing for the re-nationalization of the oil industry. Id.
110. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 739 (1990) (discussing that the students involved in the Tiananmen Square massacre wanted
greater democratic involvement in government decisions to eradicate the widespread
corruption and nepotism of communist party members).
111. Don't Lift the Arms Ban, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2004, at 13-14; see generally
Sheryl WuDunn & Nicholas Kristof, China'sRush to Riches, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept.
4, 1994, at 38 (noting that China imprisons human rights campaigners).
112. See O'Grady, supra note 1, at All (noting that China has won observer
status in the Organization of American States (OAS), an organization that promotes
democracy throughout the Americas, and that the status enables China-as an official observer of democracy in Latin America-to oversee processes that ensure that
democracy is stable in the Americas); Don't Lift the Arms Ban, supra note 111, at 13
(noting that some European countries, especially France, have called for lifting the
arms ban imposed on China after the Tiananmen Square massacre, calling the incident an "anachronism").
113. China is an outspoken opponent of the possibility of the United Nations intervention in the Sudan, where the Muslim government allegedly authorized the
slaughter of thousands of Christians. See Peter S. Goodman, China Invests Heavily
In Sudan's Oil Industry: Beijing Supplies Arms Used on Villagers, WASH. POST.,
Dec. 23, 2004, at Al, 2004 WL 101232209; Peter S. Goodman, China Stakes a Claim
in Sudan, WALL ST. J. EUR., Dec. 28, 2004, at A12, 2004 WL-WSJE 88764516. PetroChina owns forty percent of the Unity fields in Sudan. China PetroChinaForms
Overseas Arm, CHINA ECON. REV., Nov. 29, 2001, at 15, 2001 WL 12686738 (noting
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The United States has been expanding antinarcotics programs. One way in which it has encouraged cooperation from
Latin America is through trade agreements such as the Andean
Trade Preference Act. 114 This type of cooperation is also important in the War on Terror since drug trafficking fuels terror
groups worldwide.
3. Promotion of Democracy in Latin America
One major U.S. interest is the promotion of democracy
throughout Latin America. China is a communist country that
considers democracy an impediment to progress. Some regional
and economic experts believe that China will evolve from an authoritarian regime to a successful democratic society, as did
South Korea and Japan. 115 However, the Communist Party is
tightening its grip on Chinese society and it is doubtful that
China will truly welcome democratic policies. 116 China had a
chance to show the world that it would move towards democracy
that PetroChina is the listed unit of China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC)).
114. See Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3102 (2002):
Congress makes the following findings:...
(2) The Andean Trade Preference Act has been a key element in the United
States counternarcotics strategy in the Andean region, promoting export
diversification and broad-based economic development that provides sustainable economic alternatives to drug-crop production, strengthening the
legitimate economies of Andean countries and creating viable alternatives
to illicit trade in coca....
(4) The continuing instability in the Andean region poses a threat to the security interests of the United States and the world. This problem has been
partially addressed through foreign aid, such as Plan Colombia, enacted by
Congress in 2000. However, foreign aid alone is not sufficient. Enhancement of legitimate trade with the United States provides an alternative
means for reviving and stabilizing the economies in the Andean region.
(5) The Andean Trade Preference Act constitutes a tangible commitment by
the United States to the promotion of prosperity, stability, and democracy
in the beneficiary countries.
Id. § 3102.
115. OVERHOLT, supra note 59, at 137 (noting that political liberalization has
occurred largely because of a change in social structure that accompanies economic
reform, rather than a change in government policies).
116. Hu Done It, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 2004, at 14 (noting that President Hu
Jintao holds three positions: President, General Secretary of the Communist Party,
and head of the party's military commission); Lieberthal, supra note 98, at 48 (discussing the possibility that if China succeeds in managing the challenges it faces, in
2033 China will likely continue to be an authoritarian one-party system linked to
domestic business elites while keeping the lower classes engaged through the promotion of a nationalist commitment).
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when it took control of Hong Kong in 1999, but instead it chose
to curtail democracy by prohibiting elections for certain gov117
ernment positions in Hong Kong.
Many Latin Americans do not want to let the free forces of
the market dictate, nor have they seen the benefits of democracy. 118 Many of them are willing to take their chances with an
authoritarian government. 119 Latin American presidents are
frequently forced to resign and are replaced by leftist groups
that oppose globalization.12o Yet, U.S. administrations have not
given enough attention to this disturbing and growing sentiment.121
4. Environmental Standards,Market Share, and an Economic
Alternative
While the United States has provisions for environmental
standards in its trade agreements, it is doubtful that China will
let environmental concerns slow its economic progress in Latin
America. 122 China has experienced economic growth at the expense of its environment, containing nine of the world's ten most
polluted cities. 12 3 Chronic respiratory disease has become the
117. Suffrage on Sufferance, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2004, at 47 (noting that the
Chinese government refused to allow elections for Hong Kong's Chief Executive post
and for more democratic elections for its Legislative Council in 2007 and 2008).
118. In Mexico, forty-five percent of those surveyed in late 2003 said that
NAFTA had benefited their economy, down from sixty-eight percent who thought
that NAFTA would benefit Mexico in 1993. See Corchado, supra note 104, at Al.
According to Latin Barometer Corp., a Chile-based polling organization, fifty-three
percent of people polled want democratic governments, but only twenty-eight percent say that they see benefits of democracy at work. Id.
119. Selmeski, supra note 38, at 8 (citing a 2004 UN report which found that
fifty-five percent of the inhabitants of Latin America would prefer an authoritarian
government to a democratic government if it provided a better economic situation).
120. Bolivia's Referendum: Counter-reform-or Muddle Along?, supranote 49, at
35 (reporting that leftist groups in Bolivia who led a violent uprising that forced
President Sanchez de Lozada to resign in October 2003 are pressing the new government to re-nationalize the oil and gas industries).
121. See Selmeski, supra note 38, at 12-13 (noting that the United States has
ignored the fact that some Latin American democracies are faltering, and providing
a list of recommendations for ways in which U.S. administrators can work to stabilize Latin America and reach U.S. objectives).
122. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 12 (describing the environmental review process of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement as required by the
Trade Act of 2002); O'Grady, supra note 105, at All (quoting Cynthia Watson, a professor of strategy at the National War College in Washington, who stated that in order to satisfy its targeted need to find energy sources, China will treat Latin American nations as sovereigns rather than "preach to them").
123. Lieberthal, supra note 98, at 46.
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leading cause of death in the country. 124
Chinese manufacturers have been gaining market share in
industries where Mexico lost market share. 125 By mid-2003,
China surpassed Mexico as the second-largest supplier of goods
to the United States. 126 China has erased many of Mexico's economic advantages that the United States and Mexico had
worked hard for years to obtain under NAFTA.127
China may be able to develop greater clout relative to the
United States with small countries that depend on the textile
industry. As China imports great quantities of raw materials
and exports labor-intensive manufactured goods, it drives down
the price of its exports and it increases the price of raw materials that it imports. 128 Poor countries that depend on the textile
industry will earn lower prices for their exports and will have to
pay higher prices for their raw materials.1 29 China has an important bargaining chip with these countries that the United
States does not.
Some countries, particularly Cuba, have looked to China to
counter-balance the United States's world power.1 30 After the
fall of the Soviet Union, China became Cuba's political and fi124. Id. (discussing that as China emerges as an economic power, the Chinese
people are paying a high price with their declining health, especially in the large cities); see also A Great Wall of Waste, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 2004, at 55, 56 (citing the
World Bank estimation that 300,000 people per year die prematurely from respiratory diseases in China).
125. See O'Boyle, supra note 58, at 33 (reporting the U.S. government's estimation that about eighty-five percent of world production could end up in China).
126. Id. at 31.
127. China to Surpass Mexico in Trade with U.S., EFE NEWS SERV., May 14,
2003, WL EFE News Serv. File (noting that Mario Abedrop, who heads COMCE's
(Mexico's Foreign Trade Council) Mexico-China Committee, stated that the NAFTA
bloc's benefits to Mexico have gradually eroded); see also O'Boyle, supra note 58, at
33 (noting that Mexican exports to the United States have decreased while Chinese
exports to the United States have increased for similar goods).
128. The Dragon and the Eagle, supra note 45, at 10 (noting that the average
prices of shoes and clothing in America has fallen by thirty percent in real terms
over the past ten years).
129. Id. In 1995, one hundred and twenty three nations agreed to end textile
quotas, in part, because rich nations were using them to protect domestic industries.
Scott Miller & Charles Hutzler, Poor Nations Seek WTO Textile Aid, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 1, 2004, at A2 (noting that in Latin America, textile-dependent countries include El Salvador and the Dominican Republic). In the past decade, however, rich
nations have outsourced production primarily to China. Id. China now rejects any
new quotas or safeguards and instead stated that it will work to resolve these issues
directly with these countries that depend on the textile industry. Id.
130. Vanessa Bauza, Castro Observes New China; Cuban President's Visit Calls
for Increasing Relationships, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 1, 2003, at 21A, 2003 WL
14868710; O'Grady, supra note 1, at All.
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nancial partner. 13 1 China and Cuba are involved in biotechnology joint ventures and arms trade. 132 They jointly operate an
electronic warfare facility in Cuba, which is connected to
China's global satellite network. 133 Together they monitor U.S.
134
telephone conversations and Internet data.
Due to the United States's relative decline in the global
economy and its continued dependence on foreign capital in order to finance current account deficits, Latin American governments, especially Brazil and Argentina, see a window of eco-

nomic opportunity. 135

The window gives Latin American

countries a chance to develop their own economic policies. This
opportunity is even more important considering a possible
merger of the two largest trading blocs in South America: The
Andean Community and Mercosur. 136 If such a merger occurs,
the promise of increased bargaining power for these countries
may prove fatal to the proposed FTAA.
D. CHINESE LEVERAGE
With China's growing sphere of influence and economic
clout comes leverage that it may use to frustrate U.S. interests
and to gain support for diplomatic, political, and perhaps mili-

131. See Vanessa Bauza, Castro Marvels at Changed China since his '95 Visit,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 2, 2003, at A17, 2003 WL 14540822 (noting that Castro
met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin who has provided millions of dollars in
economic aid to Cuba).
132. See Bauza, supra note 130 (noting that in 2001, James Kelly, assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs stated that the Chinese had delivered military
equipment to Cuba and that Chinese military delegations have visited Cuba recently).
133. O'Grady, supra note 1, at All.
134. Id. China already presents special security concerns for the United States
since it has been working with Iran to develop anti-ship cruise missiles. See Worldwide Threats to Intelligence Community: Hearing before the Senate Select Intelligence Comm., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby),
2003 WL 294958.
135. Carranza, supra note 27, at 1037 (discussing how U.S. economic weaknesses have negatively affected its ability to control Latin America). The United
States is currently dependant on foreign capital as a means through which to finance its current account deficits. Id. Latin American countries now have an opportunity to develop their own foreign economic policies. Id.; see also supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
136. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1061-62 (noting that the Andean Community (comprised of Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru) and the MERCOSUR
(comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) have incentives to create a
greater trading bloc, which will give these groups greater bargaining power with
NAFTA countries including the United States).
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tary initiatives. 13 7 Much like the former Soviet Union's powerful control over its "member" countries, communist China may
have similar leverage over Latin American countries. If China
reaches this level of influence and if the United States confronts
China on an economic, political, or military matter, no Latin
138
American country could economically afford to oppose China.
Moreover, the United States itself may not be in a position to
oppose China.
The trade disparity between the United States and China is
the greatest of any country pair in the world: China exports
$114 billion worth of goods to the United States and imports
only $20 billion from the United States.1 39 U.S. manufacturers
have opened factories in China, predicting that in the next five
years technology manufacturing will be centered there. 140 In
the event of a confrontation, the United States may lose 100,000
export-oriented jobs.1 4 1 The United States must realize that the
Chinese threat is real and it must examine its own policies towards Latin America before China's leverage can no longer be
countered.
II. THE CHINESE THREAT, THE FTAA STUMBLING
BLOCK, AND A RECOMMENDED U.S. PLAN OF ACTION
China is securing bilateral agreements, forming partnerships with Latin American companies and governments, building and repairing infrastructure, and treating Latin American
leaders as equals and always with cortesia. As a result, China is
becoming an attractive economic alternative for Latin American
countries that have historically been forced to deal predominately with the United States.142 The United States cannot afford to distance itself from oil-producing countries in this hemisphere nor can it afford to ignore countries that may help it

137. WuDunn & Kristof, supranote 111, at 54.
138. See generally OVERHOLT, supra note 59 (arguing that as foreign trade between China and Latin America increases, Latin American countries will become
economically dependant on China).
139. Bauder, supra note 70.
140. Id. (noting that high technology manufacturers like Dell, Intel and Royal
Philips Electronics have already made plans to base technology manufacturing in
China).
141. OVERHOLT, supra note 59, at 394; see also Irwin M. Stelzer, An LBJ Conservative. . ., WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 1, 2004 at 18 (discussing how Chinese currency
is affecting the U.S. economy).
142. Brazil: ChinaAppeal, supra note 35.
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promote democracy, human rights, and its other interests. The
United States should be aware of a future threat posed by a potentially aggressive China that is economically tied to Latin
America. The United States should counter China's actions
with favorable bilateral trade agreements.
A. THE CHINA THREAT
1. Oil
Securing oil for future demand is imperative. While the
United States works to secure oil in a volatile Middle East,
China is quietly forming partnerships with the key oilproducing countries of Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador. 143 In
forming these partnerships, China is creating jobs throughout
Latin America and offering economic cooperation, joint partnerships, infrastructure construction, and over one billion new consumers. 144 In addition to agreeing to future purchases of oil,
China is involved in the actual extraction and transportation of
oil and also in the building of infrastructure to support the oil
industry. 145
The threat of China's growing interest in Latin American oil
is evident in light of two alarming and related trends: anti-U.S.
sentiment is on the rise and socialist leaders are coming to
power. These leaders are moving towards state control of the oil
industry. 146 If anti-U.S. leftist leaders control twenty percent of
the oil that the U.S. imports, an oil embargo against the United
States would become a frightening prospect, especially in the
event of a U.S. military confrontation with China.147
The United States should build on its existing relationships
with oil-producing countries in Latin America. Like China, it
should establish partnerships in order to secure oil for its future
consumption beyond maximum current output. For example,
the United States currently consumes all of the oil that Mexico
exports. Given the energy shortages in the United States since
143. See supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 80-102 and accompanying text.
145. See generally supra notes 79, 90-91 and accompanying text.
146. See Bolivia's Referendum: Counter-reform--or Muddle Along?, supra note
49, at 36; supra note 109 and accompanying text.
147. For a general discussion of Latin America's potential economic dependence
on China and how it may not be economically feasible for Latin America to defy
China, see infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
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2000, U.S. companies should have partnered with Mexican firms
to increase Mexico's oil production. Instead, China and Mexico
are taking steps to jointly develop Mexico's oil industry so that
Mexico can expand its production and export capacity. 148 Like
China, the United States must invest in the infrastructure that
will allow for successful joint exploration for oil and other commodities. Infrastructure projects provide a large incentive for
Latin American countries to trade with China since these projects will improve their infrastructure, employ thousands of
workers throughout their countries, and bring economic opportunities to small towns.
By partnering with Latin American private and public oil
firms, the United States could increase regional oil production
and secure added capacity for itself. Moreover, by addressing
Latin American infrastructure needs, the United States will
bring jobs and other economic opportunities to the region and in
the process dissipate anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America.
2. Democracy and Human Rights
In a democratic country, elected leaders are held accountable by their constituents. In an authoritarian or communist
country, there are no such checks and balances. While some
dictators or communist leaders are benign, there is no political
safeguard that will prevent future, malevolent leaders from taking aggressive action against their own people or other countries. In the event that citizens protest, non-democratic leaders
will quickly silence dissidents and continue to act with impunity. 149 The safest way to ensure peace and cooperation is to
promote democracy and respect for human rights.
China's growing influence in Latin America represents a
risk to unstable democracies in the region. If unchecked,
China's economic prominence will cause fragile democracies in
Latin America to think twice about the supposed benefits of democracy, capitalism, and globalization.1 50 There is a common
misconception that, since Latin American countries are democ-

148. See generally What has China Cost Mexico, supra note 74; supra note 87
and accompanying text.
149. See generally SPENCE, supra note 110, at 739-44.
150. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. See generally Carranza, supra
note 27, at 1048 (noting that negative reactions to globalizations have led to the removal of four presidents in the Latin American countries of Ecuador (2000), Peru
(2000), Argentina (2001), and Bolivia (2003)); Corchado, supra note 104.
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racies (with the exception of Cuba), democracy is permanent. 151
Based on the reversing trends of the past four years, it is evident that regional democracy is unstable. 152 As more socialist
presidents are elected throughout Latin America and faith in
the benefits of democracy and capitalism diminish, Latin Americans may begin to favor authoritarian regimes. 153 As China invests heavily in the region, bringing jobs and providing access to
Latin American producers for over one-and-a-half billion Chinese consumers, Latin American voters may begin to believe
that communism can really work. Communist China offers
Latin American countries an opportunity to see the economic
benefits of such a system.
The vices of communism have been evident throughout the
twentieth century.
Unlike Karl Marx's stateless, classless,
communist nation, "communist" countries have actually been
15 4
ruthless in their pursuit of party loyalty and obedience.
Unlike the moderate, evolutionary, and law-abiding outlook that
intellectuals had for communism in the beginning of the twentieth century, history has proven that the dictatorship of the proletariat has in fact suppressed expression, human rights, and
other freedoms that people hold dear. 155 While the United
States often offers trade incentives as a reward for adherence to
principles of human rights, China is likely to disregard such re156
quirements.
3. Loss of U.S. Economic And PoliticalClout
Many of China's gains may come at the expense of
terests.
For example, Latin American companies
manufacturing facilities are becoming more dependent
15 7
nese investment to lower their manufacturing costs.
151.
152.
153.
50-118
154.

U.S. inopening
on ChiCompli-

See generally Selmeski, supra note 38.
Id. at 7; see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
See Corchado, supra note 104; Selmeski, supra note 38, at 8; supra notes
and accompanying text.
See HAROLD C. HINTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE POLITICS, 94-95

(1973) (noting that Stalin used police forces to control his party and used a brutal
approach to pressure peasants).
155. See Stephen Schwartz, The New Evil Empire?, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 13,
2004, at 16 (noting that the citizens of Soviet communism were promised freedom
and wealth and instead received government oppression).
156. See supra notes 110-29 and accompanying text. This is evident by the way
China has dealt with Cuba. While the United States punishes Dictator Fidel Castro
for his human rights abuses, China freely trades with the island. Id.
157. See generally China/Brazil,supra note 96.

2005]

China's Clout Grows in Latin America

eating matters, Latin American companies in China (and Chinese companies in Latin America) may not adhere to the strict
environmental and labor standards that United States imposes
in exchange for economic aid and trade agreements. 158 Moreover, "even if average incomes remain low, a growing number of
Chinese will enjoy high incomes." 159 If China continues to grow
at the current pace, "by 2020 [its] top 100 [million] households
will have an average income equivalent to the current average
160
in western Europe."
China's regional influence has already diminished U.S. leverage with Latin American countries. For example, because of
frustrations over the results of NAFTA,161 Mexico is now focus-

ing on how it can increase trade with China. 62 Trade with the
United States will always be important for Mexico, but Mexico
now believes that its future lies in favorable trade agreements
with China. Countries that have been hurt by Chinese economic competition have realized that they must adjust and find
63
mutually beneficial trade agreements with China.
4. PotentialLoss of Support for U.S. Interests
The United States frequently bases trade agreements with
Latin American countries on cooperation with regard to human
rights, antinarcotics programs, environmental issues, antiterrorism initiatives, and U.S. national security concerns. 64 On
the other hand, China offers a less burdensome alternative to
65
dealing with the United States.'
Many Latin Americans do not share the same priorities as
158. See ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 12, at 3 ("The environmental review process is designed to ensure that, through the consistent application of principles and procedures, environmental considerations are integrated into the development of U.S. trade negotiating objectives and positions."); see also supra note 122
and accompanying text.
159. The Dragon and the Eagle, supra note 45, at 9 (discussing the possibility
that a vast market for consumer goods will be opened up when China's real income
continues to grow by eight percent a year).
160. Id.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 125-32.
162. See What has China Cost Mexico, supra note 74.
163. See id.; Mexico: Eyeing Oil Exports to China, supra note 88.
164. See Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3102 (2002); Chile FTA, supra note 12 ("Cooperative projects will help protect wildlife, reduce environmental
hazards and promote internationally recognized labor rights.").
165. See O'Grady, supra note 1 (noting that China will complicate U.S. efforts in
environmental matters and other issues because China does not concern itself with
them); see supranote 105 and accompanying text.
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the United States and believe that the United States does not
understand their concerns. 166 Some Latin American countries
struggle to find the resources to fight crime or even to feed their
people. They have problems with violent uprisings and internal
political strife. 167 Latin American countries may agree to cooperate with the United States when the United States offers attractive economic incentives but if China offers equally attractive incentives
with no burdensome
and expensive
requirements, Latin American countries may prefer to deal with
China.

168

China, on the other hand, understands Latin American concerns. It realizes that if too much focus is placed on the environment or on human rights, a particular industry may never
get off the ground or fail to be competitive in the world market. 169 In contrast to the United States, China has recently experienced these growing pains first hand and knows that dealing with certain social issues may delay progress. However,
based on past actions, it is doubtful that China would require
any cooperation in these matters.
5. PotentialLoss of Politicaland Logistical Support in the Event
of a U.S. Confrontation With China
China has made military moves and arms deals that should
raise warning signs in the United States. China has sold missile technology to Iran and delivered military equipment to
Cuba. 170 It also appears that China has set up a permanent
electronic surveillance post in Cuba, just ninety miles from the
United States. 171 These actions may be considered political jockeying. For example, China's sale of military equipment to Cuba
may be in retaliation to the United States selling arms to Taiwan. 172 Its electronic surveillance outpost may be a political response to the United States's monitoring of Chinese communications from its spy planes. A more realistic confrontation may
occur in the event of a forceful reunification with Taiwan.
China will continue using its economic power to accomplish
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
text.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

generally Selmeski, supranote 38.
supra note 120 and accompanying text.
supra notes 45-46, 100, 102, and accompanying text.
supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying notes 132-39.
supra note 120Error! Bookmark not defined, and accompanying
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its own political goals. For several decades, the United States
has had treaty obligations to protect Taiwan from mainland aggression. 173 China prefers a peaceful resolution but says it will
174
use force if necessary to bring back this "renegade province."
If the United States decides to stand firm, it may need the backing of Latin American countries in order to obtain international
legitimacy at the United Nations, where China is the only communist country on the Security Council. It is also likely that
China will not be seen as an aggressor and regarded instead as
merely reeling in its own Taiwanese citizens who could be considered outlaws for pushing for secession. The United States, on
the other hand, may be seen as an aggressor meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation, a sovereign nation whose
economic trade is imperative to continued economic growth in
Latin America.
While a lack of Latin American political support may hurt
the United States, the region's logistical cooperation with China
may prove fatal in the event of a military confrontation with the
United States. China may sabotage U.S. trade in Latin America
during a military confrontation and may even pressure Latin
American countries to stop trading in goods that "further" the
military efforts of the United States. China has controlled the
flow of goods between the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean since
Hutchinson Whampoa Ltd., a Chinese company, was given control of both the Atlantic and Pacific ports of the Panama Canal
in 1997.175 Although the United States has the right to protect
the canal pursuant to the treaty it signed with Panama, Panamanian legislators may create laws eliminating such rights. It
is conceivable that Panamanian legislators may request that the
Chinese military move into U.S. built bases in order to "protect"
the canal; after all, the Chinese have filled the void left in Cuba
when the former Soviet Union pulled out.
173. See China, Taiwan Rebuff Powell Effort, at http://www.kazine.com/databases/articles/october%2004%20(new)/china,%20taiwan%20rebutt%20powell%20effo
rt.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005) (noting that U.S. treaty obligations involve providing defensive weapons to Taiwan and also that China has threatened to invade Taiwan in the event Taiwan officially declares statehood). Taiwanese President, Chen
Shui-bian, told visiting former South Korean President, Kim Young-sam, that 'Taiwan is definitely a sovereign, independent country... that absolutely does not belong to the People's Republic of China." Id.
174. See generally id..
175. See Rowan Scarborough, China Company Grabs Power Over Panama Canal, WASHINGTON TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999, 1999 WL 3091878 (noting that Hutchinson
Whampoa Ltd., a shipping company with ties to China's leadership and its armed
forces, controls both the Atlantic and the Pacific ports of the Panama Canal).
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As China's need for oil and as its obsession with reining in
Taiwan grows, China's control over the Panama Canal becomes
more important. The Chinese military recently published a
book entitled "Liberating Taiwan," detailing a plan to use Chinese warships to impose oil embargoes on Taiwan, Japan, and
on the United States.176 In the event of such a confrontation the
loss of oil from Latin American countries may prove lethal to the
United States. It is with this sense of urgency that the United
States should counter China's growing influence by offering favorable bilateral trade agreements and reconsidering the wisdom of its agricultural subsidies.
B. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PROCEED SLOWLY WITH THE
FTAA AND Focus ON BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

1. The United States Should Not Insist on the FTAA Until It
Helps Latin American Countries Establish Sound Social Policies
The FTAA may bring attractive long-term benefits potentially offering lower prices for consumers and forcing countries
to strengthen their comparative advantages. 177 However, it may
be difficult if not impossible to reach those long-term benefits if
the short-term negative effects of free trade cannot be overcome.
For example, when foreign competitors are allowed to compete
with each other, many domestic industries are forced to lay off
workers and eliminate contracts with smaller providers of components or raw material in order to increase their productivity. 178

If these and other negative effects are substantial, the

pressure to implement protectionist measures will increase. 179
The United States should not insist on the FTAA before

176. Bremner & Roberts, supra note 74, at 61.
177. See Nagging Debts About the Benefits of Globalization, and a Look at the
Evidence, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2004, at 80 ("[A]ll countries can raise their living
standards through specialisation and trade ....
[Countries] gain] from focusing on
the goods in which [their] relative advantage is greatest .... "). The gains from the
winning sectors should more than compensate for the losses of the losing sectors. Id.
178. See Lindsay M. Fain6, Note, The Internationalizationof Chilean Agriculture: Implications of the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 13 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 383, 404 (2004).

179. See generally Selmeski, supra note 38. The irony is that the protectionist
measures that keep competition out of the country actually keep the prices of domestic goods artificially high. These high prices are financed primarily by poor consumers, many of whom pushed for protectionist measures in the first place. See Fain6,
supra note 178, at 403.
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Latin American countries are ready to deal successfully with the
short-term negative effects of free trade. Latin American countries will have to establish sound social policies-such as job
placement and government retraining programs-before a free
trade agreement is implemented. People whose countries do not
have proper social policies in place will be disappointed in the
results of the FTAA and will lobby against it. President Bush
must also deal with the political pressures of domestic parties
0
such as labor unions and business groups. 18
It is in this political reality that the United States expects
Latin American countries to open its markets to U.S. goods
while accepting the generous farm subsidies the United States
bestows on its farming sector.18 1 U.S. agricultural subsidies are
a political sticking point in the FTAA negotiations, especially for
Brazil. U.S. politicians cannot afford to lose potential votes in
agricultural states such as Florida and President Bush has
made it clear that farm subsidies will be excluded from FTAA
negotiations.18 2 Without giving up farm subsidies as Latin
Americans demand, the United States will not be able to obtain
the concessions that it demands, such as intellectual property
and antidumping provisions, nor will President Bush be able to
obtain a satisfactory FTAA.183 Without "a genuine initial balance of reciprocal concessions the final products of the negotiations ends up disproportionately benefiting the United
States."18 4 The United States should recognize that Latin
American leaders feel these pressures to a greater degree since
significant portions of Latin American populations are often affected by pro-trade policies. Additionally, these affected populations often create more trouble for their leaders even during
non-election years (for example by blocking roads, violently
demonstrating, and clashing with police forces). 18 5
180. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1045 ("Domestic political constraints will
significantly affect the outcome of the FTAA negotiations: 'The choices of U.S. trade
negotiators are greatly affected by the demands of... domestic constituencies, including labor, environment, and business groups, all of which in turn impact the
more general perceptions of the American public."') (quoting Christopher M. Bruner,
HemisphericIntegration and the Politics of Regionalism: The Free Trade Area of the
Americas, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 64 (2002)).
181. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
182. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1050 (asserting that President Bush will
not make concessions on agricultural subsidies, which have strong domestic constituencies in battleground states).
183. See id.
184. Id. at 1053.
185. See Bolivia's Referendum: Counter-reform--or Muddle Along?, supra note
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In non-democratic countries trade liberalization may not be
quite so complex. When there is no realistic threat of internal
dissent, it is easy to accomplish aggressive trade goals that will
benefit the country in the long term. Chile, for example, is now
a democratic country and one of the most open countries in the
world with regard to trade. However, Chile achieved this openness largely because of policies created under its dictatorial regime. In 1973, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew the government, named himself president, eliminated union power, and
began to liberalize trade.18 6 Despite some tariff increases during the 1980s, Chile continued its trade liberalization during the
democratic transition in 1990.187 However, now that Chile is a
stable democracy, and as worker groups proliferate, there is
growing internal opposition to Chile's broad trade liberalization,
particularly from the rural peasant farmers whom the government may not have taken into account in conducting its trade
88

negotiations.1

Like Chile during its dictatorial years, non-democratic
China has the political flexibility to offer generous trade agreements to Latin American countries because they face no realistic
threat of internal dissent. China's authoritative regime is free
to implement trade policies that may be unfavorable to a segment of its population. While the United States may be politically constrained from offering concessions that some Latin
American countries desire-such as access to U.S. agricultural
markets-China may be in a better position to grant these con89
cessions.1
An aggressive push for the FTAA by the United States
could erase a decade of progress with regards to the lowering of
tariffs and would make it easier for leftist, anti-American, proprotectionist candidates to be elected to office throughout Latin
America. The United States has employed aggressive, if not coercive, pressure in promoting the FTAA.190 Robert Zoellick, U.S.
49; supra note 120 and accompanying text.
186. See Fain6, supra note 178, at 387-90.
187. See id. at 389-90.
188. See id. at 389 (discussing how Chile did not properly implement important
social policies that would have helped poor farmers adjust to trade liberalization).
189. See Brazil Exports, supranote 82.
190. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1039-40 ("[Ihe United States has deployed a coercive, rather than benevolent, diplomacy."). Countries that stood firm
with Brazil were issued economic threats. Id. For example, Caribbean nations were
"told to forget about a newly negotiated trade agreement." Id. Central American
countries were issued similar warnings. Eventually they ended their support for the
Brazilian position but still did not fully embrace the U.S. position. Id.
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Trade Representative, has said that "America will not wait for
the won't-do countries." 19 1 An aggressive push for the FTAA
also adds to the perception that only the United States will
benefit from such an agreement. This belief is further fueled by
the United States's refusal to find a fair trade balance and the
way in which the United States has pressured Brazil by attempting to isolate it.192 Even seemingly non-protectionist
measures employed by the United States are perceived as an attempt to benefit the United States. Labor and environmental
standards, for example, are seen as excuses to remove any competitive advantage that a smaller country may have over the
United States. 193 Studies support this notion and show that the
FTAA will provide greater benefits to the United States than to
94
Latin America. 1
The FTAA would provide judicial tools beneficial to U.S.
domestic production. For example, U.S. multinational corporations would be able to sue Latin American governments in special trade courts if those governments allow their corporations to
cut corners by ignoring environmental laws. Additionally, when
the wages of U.S. laborers increase, U.S. firms may be able to
use this judicial tool to sue Latin American governments in order to make sure that their wages also increase. 195 Another onesided benefit for the United States is the elimination of national
restrictions on government procurement. U.S. companies could
afford to bid for prized government contracts in military bases
and ports throughout Latin America. It is highly unlikely that
Latin American companies could compete for similar government projects in the United States. 196 The FTAA, it is said,
would allow the United States to reassert its hegemony over
191. Id. at 1055 (citing Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won'tdo Countries, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at 23).
192. Id. at 1057. Brazil demanded a "genuine balance of reciprocal concessions"
but the United States decided to try to isolate Brazil by negotiating around it. Id.
The United States effectively attracts Latin American countries with limited access
to the U.S. market while maintaining its agricultural subsidies. Id. Argentina was
given a trade offer by the United States as part of this "divide and conquer" strategy
but Argentina declined and instead sided with Brazil. Id.
193. See Ball, supra note 32, at B13.
194. Carranza, supra note 27, at 1038 ("[Imt is highly doubtful that Latin American countries stand to gain much from entering into an arrangement which gives
their rich counterparts-the USA and Canada-a much greater preferential market
access than the later are able to offer in return .. ")(citing Arvind Panagariya, The

Free Trade Area of the Americas: Good for Latin America?, WORLD ECON. 485, 50405 (1996)) (alteration in original).
195. Id. at 1032.
196. See id.
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Latin America to compensate for the relative decline of U.S.
global economic position. 197

2. Agricultural Subsidies Within the Legal Framework of the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture
The United States has insisted on leaving the topic of agricultural subsidies off the table throughout the FTAA negotiations, preferring to discuss it within the WTO legal framework
instead. 198 Although the goal of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture ("Agreement") is to liberalize agricultural trade, 199 the
Agreement has enabled developed countries to maintain "tradedistorting subsidies and import restrictions."20 0 The Agreement's provisions favor agricultural producers in developed
countries. For example, one characteristic of the Agreement is
that it converts non-tariff barriers to tariffs, while prohibiting
further non-tariff barriers. 20 1 Unfortunately, "many developed
countries evaded the underlying objective.., by setting... tariff equivalents for non-tariff barriers at ... excessively high

level[s]. '"202
In essence, developed countries created tariff
equivalents with higher levels of protection than those used
"under the old system of quotas and variable import levies." 20 3

Another way that the Agreement benefits agricultural producers in developed countries is by allowing them to determine

197. Id. at 1034 ("[The FTAA is part of the U.S. 'imperial project' to consolidate
'client regimes' in Latin America.") (citing James Petras, U.S. Offensive in Latin
America: Coups, Retreats, and Radicalization,availableat http://www.monthly
review.org/0502petras.htm).
198. Id. at 1050.
199. See generally Gonzalez, supranote 43, at 452-53.
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture obligates WTO members to liberalize
agricultural trade in three significant respects. First, the Agreement expands market access by requiring the conversion of all non-tariff barriers to
tariffs (tariffication) and the binding and reduction of these tariffs. Second,
the Agreement requires the reduction of both the volume of and expenditures on subsidized exports. Third, the Agreement requires the reduction of
trade-distorting domestic subsidies.

Id.
200. Id. at 460.
201. Id. at 453, 460 (noting that non-tariff import restrictions include "quotas,
embargoes, variable import levies, minimum import prices, and non-tariff measures
maintained by state enterprises").
202. Id. at 460 (discussing that this "dirty tariffication" nullified the benefits of
tariff bindings and tariff reduction by creating tariff equivalents).
203. Id. at 460-61.
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which tariffs to reduce. 204 Naturally, developed countries reduced tariffs on items produced outside of their borders. 205 Developed countries were also able to utilize the Agreement's
unique safeguard provision, which allowed them to impose "additional duties in the event of an import surge or of particularly
low prices compared with 1986-88 levels."206

The developed

countries would then set the trigger prices far above this average. 207

This safeguard provision, though, is not available to

most developing countries. It is available only to those countries that have engaged in "tariffication" in the past (those that
208
converted all their non-tariff barriers to tariffs).
While attempting to liberalize agricultural trade, "the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture did not prohibit the use of export
subsidies in the agricultural sector." 209 Under the agreement,
developed countries are able to use export subsidies to their advantage over developing countries because developed countries
have "historically subsidized agricultural production, whereas
developing countries have historically needed to tax the agricultural sector."2 10 In fact, "only 25 out of 135 countries have the
211
right.., to subsidize exports."
With regards to domestic subsidies, the Agreement requires
countries to reduce them.

2 12

In the interest of reducing domestic

subsidies, "[t]he Agreement require[s] countries to reduce domestic subsidies based on an Aggregate Measure of Support
(AMS),"213 but the Agreement also exempts many of the subsi204. Gonzalez, supranote 43, at 461.
205. Id. (commenting further that the Agreement required a thirty-six percent
reduction on average and noting that tariff reductions differed between temperatezone products and tropical products, the later being lower and the former higher).
206. Id. at 462-63.
207. Id. at 463 (discussing that developed countries are able to reduce market
access by applying additional duties whenever the world market price for a particular good reaches a certain percentage below the inflated trigger price).
208. Id. at 463.
209. Id. at 463-64 (noting that the agreement merely requires a reduction in
export subsidies). The Agreement actually establishes "permissible levels of market
distortion." Id. at 464.
210. Gonzalez, supra note 43, at 464 (discussing further that the Agreement exacerbates inequalities between developed and developing countries).
211. Id. (noting further that the Agreement exacerbates inequalities between
developed and developing countries).
212. Id. at 465.
213. Id. at 466 ("[AMS is] a baseline figure that [takes] into account all domestic
agricultural subsidies during the 1986-88 base period."). In calculating the AMS,
several factors are considered: "amber box" subsidies are "those subsidies deemed to
be most trade-distorting"; "blue box" subsidies are "direct payments to farmers under production limiting programs"; "green box" subsidies are those that have "mini-
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dies traditionally utilized by developed countries. 214
The U.S. Farm Act, which provides certain subsidies to the
American farming sector, introduces counter-cyclical payments. 2 15 These payments are controversial because the United
States claims that counter-cyclical payments fall under the
"green box" exemption since the money is not linked to what the
farmers grow, nor to how much they grow. 216 Critics argue that
counter-cyclical payments should not be exempt because they
are indeed linked to production influencing the fair price that
farmers should be able to obtain. 217 Latin American countries
recognize that the WTO legal framework within which the
United States wants to negotiate clearly provides the United
States with an unfair competitive advantage. 218 If the United
States insists on installing the Agreement as the legal framework for the FTAA, key players such as Brazil and Argentina
will not join the FTAA and ultimately the FTAA will not be
formed.
C. RECOMMENDED U.S. STRATEGY

For now, the United States should forgo the FTAA and instead promote an individualized trade plan for each Latin
American country. 21 9 The United States should use industryspecific and country-specific consultative committees just like it
mal or no trade-distorting effects" and are therefore exempted from subsidy reduction. Id.
214. Id. at 465 (discussing further that these exemptions lead to a marginal decrease in domestic subsidies).
215. See generally Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-171 § 1103(d), 116 Stat. 134 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C.) (allowing payment from 2002 through 2007 when the
effective price for the covered commodity is less than the target price for the covered
commodity).
216. See generally Sophia Murphy, Farm Bill Outrage Goes Global, FOREIGN
POL 'Y IN Focus, May 22, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.fpif.org/pdflgac/
0205farmbill.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (asserting that the farm bill's countercyclical payments are not "decoupled" from production). Under the Uruguay Round,
"countries could give as much as they wanted to their producers if the payments
were 'decoupled'-meaning that such government payments should not be linked to
either what farmers grew or how much they grew." Id.
217. Id.
218. Gonzalez, supra note 43, at 464 ("By permitting past users of export subsidies to maintain these subsidies, subject to certain reduction obligations, while prohibiting the introduction of new subsidies, the Agreement institutionalized the unfair competitive advantage held by developed country producers.") (internal citations
omitted).
219. See Carranza, supra note 27, at 1036.
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is presently doing under NAFTA. 2 20 At this time, the FTAA
would be detrimental to small countries that do not have the
necessary social policies in place to ensure a successful adjustment to free trade. 22 1 In the meantime, individual industries
can work with their governments and with U.S. trade representatives to implement sound social policies to ameliorate the impact of free trade. Matters of human rights (decent working
conditions and wages), assistance with terrorism (particularly in
potential hotspots in the Iguazu region), and other U.S. interests (such as antinarcotics cooperation) can be tied into each individualized trade plan but the most important part of this plan
is the mutual cooperation between the United States and each
Latin American country in the interest of developing social policies that will alleviate the short-term pains due to free trade.
These social policies must specifically consider the very poor
sectors of society and populations with limited skill sets. The
fact that many Latin American countries do not have the resources to retrain their citizens is problematic. By not taking
these citizens into account in developing their social policies,
Latin American countries run the risk of fueling dangerous uprisings which further impede economic progress. Poor Latin
Americans must be taught new skills that will enable Latin
American countries to improve upon their comparative advantage in the aggregate.
Social policies meant to ameliorate the short-term impact of
free trade are meaningless without reliable physical infrastructures like roads and potable water. Specifically, Latin American
countries lack dependable roads and basic services like trash
collection and telephone access. The United States must be an
active participant lest it be seen as the greedy instigator of
harmful big business trade agreements. 222 The United States
must be ready to partner with each Latin American country to
build the infrastructure necessary to support these social policies. Like China, the United States should pursue joint ventures with local companies and governments in order to build
roads, upgrade sewer systems, and provide telephone service to
tens of thousands of people. Genuine partnerships will create
jobs, promote trade, and improve overall relations between the
United States and Latin American countries. 223
220.
221.
222.
223.

See
See
See
See

Trade Policy Initiatives,supra note 11, at 7.
Carranza, supra note 27, at 1050-51.
id. at 1054.
id. at 1064.
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The United States also needs to address domestic political
problems before free trade agreements are made with Latin
America. Otherwise, groups of citizens may make it politically
impossible for U.S. legislators to approve free trade agreements.
The United States could take important domestic steps now in
order to prepare itself for a future FTAA. For example, it could
open its agricultural industry to a few countries at a time,
thereby giving U.S. farmers time to adjust and sending a message to Brazil and other Latin American countries that it is sincere about a fair FTAA in the future. 224 Another important reason why the United States should consider opening its
agricultural industry, even if it is to one country at a time, is
that China is becoming an attractive alternative trade partner
to Latin American countries. China has to feed over one-and-ahalf billion people and it seeks to import agricultural products
from Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and other Latin American countries in order to do so. 225 With such a willing consumer, Latin

America will have an attractive alternative to the United States
if the United States refuses to budge in its protection of its agricultural industry.
The United States must take seriously the national priorities of each Latin American country. 226 The United States
should not pressure Latin American politicians but rather it
should treat Latin American leaders with cortesia, that is, it
should not ignore (not addressing their concerns and interests),
bully (aggressively pushing for the FTAA), or perplex (pushing
for the FTAA while maintaining U.S. agricultural subsidies)
Latin American leaders. 22 7 It should present a clearer vision for
228
Latin American policy.

CONCLUSION
Trade relations between China and Latin America are
growing. China is forming solid economic alliances and providing an attractive alternative to dealing with the United States.
The United States cannot afford to lose economic or political
clout to China or it may lose Latin American support for impor224.
225.
Fruit to
226.
227.
228.

See id. at 1065.
See Brazil Exports, supra note 82; Brazil: China Appeal, supra note 35;
China,supra note 85.
See Selmeski, supranote 38, at 12.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 13.
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tant interests such as human rights, democracy, and a reliable
oil supply.
The United States must act to counter China's involvement
by opting for bilateral trade agreements with sound social policies rather than by aggressively pursuing the FTAA. The
United States should not hide behind the legal framework of the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture because this increases Latin
American resentment and encourages these countries to seek
other trading partners like China. Instead, the United States
should understand and address the needs of each Latin American country and form partnerships in key sectors such as the oil
industry. It must also work with Latin American governments
to build the infrastructure necessary to support future, mutually-beneficial free-trade agreements. Due to the factors outlined in this Note, such as increasing anti-U.S. sentiment, the
growing popularity of leftist leaders, the emergence of China as
an economic alternative to dealing with the United States, and a
trend towards the nationalization of oil industries, the more aggressively the United States pushes for the FTAA without taking into account social policies in Latin America, the more precarious its future supply of regional oil becomes. More than
economic trade is at stake for the United States.
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